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Abstract 
Freedom in nations can affect the happiness of citizens both positively and negatively. This 
study takes stock of the balance of effects. It considers 1) whether there is a positive net-effect at 
all, 2) which freedom variants contribute most to happiness 3) in what conditions.  
 Freedom is conceived as chance to choose, requiring 'opportunity' to choose, and 
'capability' to choose. Opportunity to choose is measured by absence of restrictions in 
economic, political and personal life. Capability to choose is measured by information and 
inclination to go one's own way.  
 Happiness is conceived as the overall appreciation of ones life as a whole. Average 
happiness in nations is measured by responses to questions on the matter in representative 
surveys. 
 
Data on both freedom and happiness is available for 46 nations in the early 1990's. Analysis 
shows first of all positive correlations between freedom and happiness. Yet closer analysis 
reveals that freedom and happiness do not always concur. 
 Freedom is positively related to happiness among rich nations, but not among poor 
nations. Apparently freedom does not pay in poverty. Further, freedom is related to happiness 
only when 'opportunity' and 'capability' coincide. 
 A notable exception is economic freedom. Opportunity for free trade is positively related 
to happiness in poor nations, but not in rich nations. Similarly, the relation between economic 
freedom and happiness is strongest in nations where capability to choose is lowest.  
 
The findings show that freedom does not always breed happiness, and suggest that economic 
freedom deserves priority. 
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1.         INTRODUCTION 
‘Freedom, equality, and brotherhood' was the credo of the French Revolution. This entreaty was 
linked to the concept of happiness, which was also under discussion by fashionable authors at 
the time. It was believed that people could live happier lives if more of society put these 
principles into practice. This classic view of the Enlightenment is still with us today. But is it 
realistic? Freedom, equality, and brotherhood are mixed blessings, and their realization is not 
always compatible. 
 For a long time, this principle could not be tested empirically. The degree of freedom, 
equality, and brotherhood in society could barely be measured, and neither could the happiness 
of citizens. However, during the last decades most of the measurement problems have been 
solved. Fairly good data are now available on some 50,  mainly developed, nations. The first 
explorations of these data yield intriguing results.  
 The presumed link between 'equality' and happiness fails to appear, at least where 
income equality is concerned. Average happiness is as high in countries with great income in-
equality as in nations where income differences are small (Veenhoven 1997a:49). Happiness is 
also not higher in egalitaristic welfare states (Veenhoven & Ouweneel 1995). 'Brotherhood' ap-
pears to be no sure ticket to happiness either, though we cannot be happy without good relations 
with our neighbors, we can live without relations of the brotherhood type. Average happiness 
appears to be higher in individualistic societies against that in communitarian settings (Veenh-
oven 1997b). The next question is whether the 'freedom' factor fulfills the promises of the 
French Revolution. 
 
The issue 
Opinion about the impact of freedom on happiness is mixed. Different philosophies stress 
different effects and suggest different net outcomes.  
 Individualistic social philosophy stresses the possible positive effects. It is typically 
assumed that people themselves know best what will make them happy, and hence that they will 
enjoy life more if they can follow their own preferences. Conflicts of interest are seen to be 
solved by the invisible hand of the market, which is believed to yield more optimal solutions 
than prescription by king or custom. Though this intellectual tradition is not blind to the perils of 
free choice, it expects that the positive effects prevail. 
 Conservative thought tends to emphasize the negative consequences of freedom. 
Conservatives doubt that people really know what is best for them. The wisdom of tradition and 
the benefits of solidarity are seen to bring a better life than short sighted egoism. Through the 
ages proponents of this view have complained that individual freedom has gone too far, that it is 
about to destroy vital institutions. Again, the other side of the coin is also acknowledged but 
deemed to be less relevant. 
 Some schools see different effects of different variants of freedom. Currently the New 
Right is quite positive about economic freedom, but at the same time it is critical about freedom 
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in the private sphere of life. Free sex and the legalization of soft drugs are seen to lead to 
unhappiness. Likewise the leading view in South-East Asia is that economic freedom will 
improve the human lot but not political freedom. 
 An other theme in the discussion is that freedom will add to happiness only in specific 
conditions. The most commonly mentioned condition is that people are sufficiently 'mature'. If 
incapable to choose people will fear freedom and seek refuge under authoritarian leaders and 
strict rules for life  (e.g. Fromm 1941).  
 
Research questions 
Three sets of questions are addressed in this chapter: The first is: Are the effects of freedom on 
happiness positive on balance? If so, how important is freedom relative to other societal 
predictors of happiness? The second is: What kind of freedom is most conductive to happiness? 
Do all freedom variants work out equally or are some kinds more essential? One of the issues in 
this context is whether happiness depends more on freedom in private life than in public life, 
that is, the economy and politics. The third is: To what extent does the balance of effects 
depends on circumstances?  Does freedom add to happiness only in so-called 'developed' soci-
eties? 
 Answering these questions requires, first of all, that the concepts be defined and 
measured. To that end we will first consider freedom (§ 2) and then happiness (§ 3). The next re-
quirement is that the interrelationships be explored. Correlational analyses are reported in § 4 
and the findings are discussed in § 5. 
 
 
 2        FREEDOM 
 
2.1      Concept of Freedom 
Freedom can be defined as the possibility to choose. A person can be said to be free if his or her 
condition allows some choice and if that choice is not inhibited by others. In this sense absolute 
freedom is not possible. The human condition allows only a limited array of options: We cannot 
choose to fly or choose not to sleep any more; we cannot even choose to live on our own 
entirely, so mutual interdependence implies much interference. We deal here with the degree to 
which choice is limited.  
 The 'possibility' to choose requires first of all that there be an 'opportunity' to choose. 
This is an attribute of the environment. In the second place it requires a 'capability' to choose, 
which is, at  last resort, an individual attribute. 
 
Opportunity to choose  
This opportunity to choose involves two requirements: first that there be something to choose 
and second that choice  not be blocked by others.  
 In the first sense, freedom depends on the societal supply of life style alternatives. That 
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variety in life style options depends primarily of all on the mode of existence. For example, 
simple hunter gatherer societies provide their members with a more limited assortment than 
highly differentiated industrial societies. Variety depends also on internal dynamics and on 
contacts with foreign cultures. In this meaning, the concept of freedom overlaps more or less 
with notions of material affluence, division of work and cultural variety. This broad meaning 
will not be considered in this paper. The reason is simply that it is too much to handle. 
 Provided that there is something to choose, opportunity  to choose depends further on 
absence of restriction by others. Bay (1965) refers to this variant as ‘social freedom’. In this 
sense freedom is freedom from impediments, such as restrictive laws or oppression by the 
powerful. This is the kind of freedom pursued in the French Revolution. The focus of this study 
is on that latter freedom concept. 
 
Capability to choose  
The possibility to choose requires more than mere 'opportunity'. The opportunity must be seized. 
This requires an inner 'awareness of alternatives' and the 'courage to choose'. 
 A primary capability requisite is that the opportunity be acknowledged. The captives 
who fail to see that the door of their jail is open cannot flee, even though they would if they 
knew. In this sense freedom is determined by education and information. Bay (1965) calls it 
'potential freedom'.  
 The secondary demand is that recognition of opportunity is acted upon. This depends in 
the first place on an ‘inclination’ to choose. The captives who see the open door may let that 
opportunity pass because they are not too eager to take their fate into their own hands. 
Inclination may depend on moral conviction and on reality beliefs. Even if one would like to 
seize the opportunity, there is still the problem that not everybody dares to. Choice involves 
mostly uncertainty and responsibility. Often people shy away from this. The reader may 
remember the last scene of 'One flew over the Cuckoos nest'. In this context, Bay (1965) speaks 
of 'psychological freedom'. 
 
 
2.2      Measures of Freedom 
As yet there is no comprehensive measure of freedom in nations, though there are partial 
measures. With respect to 'opportunity to choose', there are attempts to measure differences 
across nations in absence of restrictions in economic life and in political life. A new measure of 
nonrestraint in private life is proposed in this paper.  
 Measures of  'capability to choose' in nations are even more scarce. Though there are 
many good indicators at the individual level, there is little at the national level. New measures 
for this aspect are also proposed in this paper. 
 
2.2.1   Measures of opportunity to choose 
Restrictions to choice can best be measured by considering spheres of life separately. We will 
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review measures of freedom in economic, political, and private life below. Though these three 
domains do not constitute the whole of life, they cover at least much of it. The sum of 
restrictions in these fields is indicative of the room for choice in a society. 
 
Economic freedom  In the broad sense, 'economic freedom' means opportunity for exchange of 
goods and services. That opportunity depends on many things, such as presence of a common 
language, mutual trust, and established custom. Without an economy there cannot be economic 
freedom. In the more limited sense used here, economic freedom means absence of restrictions 
on free trade, such as price control, excessive taxing, or closed-shop practices.  
 The latter meaning is operationalized in an index devised by the Fraser Institute, reputed 
to be a think tank of the New Right. This index is based on national ratings for security of 
money (4 items), free enterprise (6 items), freedom from excessive taxes (3 items), and freedom 
of money transfer (5 items). The items are presented in appendix 1. This index  has been 
computed for most nations of the world in the early 1990's. Scores on the index have been 
shown to predict economic growth quite well. Since the 1970's economic growth was higher in 
the economically most free nations (Gwartney 1996). 
 
Political freedom  Likewise political freedom in the broad sense requires that there be a political 
system. In the more limited sense the concept refers to restrictions on participation in the system.  
 That latter meaning is operationalized in two indexes kept by Freedom House, which is a 
liberalist pressure group, comparable to Amnesty International. The Freedom House indexes are 
a continuation of Gastril's (1987) registration of human rights violation in nations. One concerns 
civil rights such as free speech (11 items). The other deals with political rights and considers 
things like free elections (9 items). Scores on this index are available for most nations of the 
present day world (Karantnycky 1996). This is presented in appendix 1. 
 
Private freedom Restriction in the private sphere of life can be measured in a similar way. One 
can consider various private domains and estimate the degree to which choice is limited in that 
domain. As yet no such attempts have been reported. A first shot is presented in this section. 
 Restriction of choice is most manifest in legal constraints. Legal restraints can be 
assessed by inspection of legislation and law enforcement. Comparative data on these matters 
are reported in several sources, for example Humana (1992) and IPPF (1990). Many restrictions 
in private life are often informal, however, especially restrictions on sexuality. The degree of 
informal social control in nations can be estimated on the basis of attitudinal data. Most of these 
data can be found in the World Values Survey, which was conducted in 43 nations in the early 
1990's.  
 On the basis of these sources of information I was able to approximate restrictions in the 
following fields: restrictions on the practice of one's religion, restrictions on travel in the country 
and abroad, restrictions on entering into marriage and getting divorced, restrictions on sexuality 
and reproduction, and finally restrictions on ending one's own life. No comparable data were 
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found on restrictions on dress, use of drugs, and choice of vocation. The available data are 
presented in more detail in appendix 1. 
 
2.2.2     Measures of capability to choose 
Two aspects of capability to choose were mentioned above: 'awareness of alternatives' and 
'inclination to choose'. Neither matter has been the subject of earlier comparative research, so 
this paper also introduces new measures for these freedom variants. 
 
Awareness of alternatives The best way to assess awareness of alternatives is to survey 
perceived options in the various life domains. Such data are not available. Second best is to use 
data on education and information, assuming that well educated and informed people tend to see 
more alternatives. On these matters there are comparable data.  
 The level of education in nations is estimated on the basis of school enrollment and adult 
literacy. Data were found in the Human Development Report (UN-DP 1995). The level of 
information can, in principle, be assessed by estimating media variety, media attendance, and 
practice of criticism in the media. Unfortunately, data on these matters are not available for a 
sufficient number of countries. 
 
Inclination to choose As noted above, the chance that people act on the opportunities they see 
will partly depend on their values and beliefs. Chances will be greater if people respect indi-
vidual preference and an individualist identity. Currently, the best indicators of adherence to 
individualist values come from studies in the tradition of Hofstede (1991), which assess 
adherence to individualist work-attitudes in nations. Some of these studies used nearly identical 
items. The combination of these studies has yielded 39 cases.  
 The possibility  of choice will also be greater if people believe that they are in control of 
their fate. People who see  themselves as a play thing of fate are less likely to seize the opportu-
nities they see. Perceived fate-control was assessed in the World Values Survey, by single item. 
This score is available for 42 nations (Inglehart et al 1998). For the purpose of this study, the 
national scores on work attitudes and perceived fate-control are combined in one index of 
'inclination to choose'.  
 
Courage to choose Inclination to choose is often not sufficient, some courage is also needed 
especially if the choice is contested. The measurement of this attribute requires information 
about stress tolerance and psychological assertiveness. Unfortunately, comparable data on this 
matter are not available for a sufficient number of nations. 
 
 
 
2.2.3    Validity of the measures of freedom 
The measures of freedom are summarized in scheme 4, left column. All these measures have 
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considerable face validity, but do they really measure freedom?  
 One check is testing congruent validity, that is, assessing the correspondence of scores 
on these measures. Though the different aspects of freedom are not necessarily related, it is not 
unlikely that they root in common grounds and that they reinforce each other. So one could still 
expect sizable correlations. The inter-correlations are indeed sizable. Looking again at scheme 4, 
note that the bottom row is not corrected for autocorrelation. 
 Another check is testing for concurrent validity, that is assessing correspondence with 
related matters. Some data are presented in scheme 5. The freedom measures do indeed appear to 
be highly correlated with individualism, human rights, and the emancipation of women. There is 
also a firm correlation with perceived freedom. 
 
 2.3      Freedom rank of nations 
The three measures of opportunity to choose were combined in an average z-score per nation. 
The results are listed in appendix 2, and presented graphically on scheme 1. In the bar chart China 
stands out as the nation that provides the fewest opportunities, closely followed by, Nigeria, 
Russia, and India. At the middle of the chart we see countries like the Philippines, former 
Czechoslovakia, and Chile. Opportunity for choice appears greatest in Canada, Switzerland, and 
the Netherlands. The ranking fits fairly well with what a regular newspaper reader would expect. 
Only the low score of Israel comes as a surprise. 
 
 
The measures of capability to choose were combined in the same way. The results are also listed 
in appendix 2 and presented graphically on scheme 2. At the lowest end we see again  Nigeria, 
India, and China. Yet Russia and Cuba perform better in this regard, mainly because the educa-
tion in these countries is good. In the middle we see again the Philippines and Chile, while 
Czechoslovakia scores lower on capability than it did on opportunity. The top scorers are not too 
different either. Again, we see the US, Switzerland, and Canada. Israel surprises us again, now 
with an unexpected high capability to choose. Apparently, Israel is a country that provides little 
opportunity for otherwise capable citizens. 
 
 
 
The summed  indexes of 'opportunity to choose' and summed 'capability to choose' were 
combined in a comprehensive measure of freedom. The rank order on that overall index is 
somewhat identical with the results presented earlier. Hence this chart is not provided. The 
scores are given in appendix 2. 
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 3         HAPPINESS 
 
3.1      Concept of happiness 
The term happiness can have different meanings, both 'objective' and 'subjective' meanings. In 
the objective sense, happiness is living in good conditions, such as material prosperity, peace, 
and ... freedom, and in this interpretation, freedom and happiness are more or less synonymous 
words.  
 In the subjective sense happiness is a state of mind and refers to evanescent feelings as 
well as a stable appreciation of life. For our purposes,  the term is used only in the latter sense. 
Happiness is defined as the degree to which someone evaluates positively the overall quality of  
his or her present 'life as a whole'. In other words, this is about how much one likes the life one 
lives. In this interpretation,  freedom and happiness are different. 
 The term `life satisfaction' carries the same meaning and is often used interchangeably 
with 'happiness'. An advantage of using the term life satisfaction over the word `happiness' is 
that it emphasizes the subjective character of the concept. An other current synonym is 
`subjective wellbeing'. Though this phrase makes clear that it is the subject who makes the ap-
praisal, it is not so clear what the subject appraises. The term is not only used for satisfaction 
with one's entire life as a whole, but also for specific discomforts and passing moods. 
 The concept of happiness denotes an overall evaluation of life. So the appraisal that life 
is `free' does not indicate  it as that `happy'. There may be too much freedom in life and too little 
of other qualities. The overall evaluation of life involves all the criteria figuring in the mind of 
the individual: how good life feels, how well life meets expectations, how desirable life is 
deemed to be, and so on. The object of evaluation is 'life in its entirety', and not a specific 
domain of life, such as work life. The enjoyment of work will add to the appreciation of life, but 
does not constitute it. 
 The appraisals of life can concern different periods in time: how life has been, how life 
is now, and how life will probably be in the future. These evaluations do not coincide 
necessarily; one may be positive about past life, but negative about the future. The focus here is 
on satisfaction with the life one currently leads. 
 When we appraise how much we appreciate the life we live, we seem to use two sources 
of information: we estimate our typical affective experience to asses how well we feel generally, 
and at the cognitive level we compare 'life as it is' with standards of 'how life should be'. The 
former affective source of information seems generally to be more important than the latter 
cognitive one (Veenhoven 1996a: 33-35). The word happiness is commonly used for these 
'subtotals' as well as for the comprehensive appraisal. I use the terms 'overall happiness' or 'life 
satisfaction' for the comprehensive judgment and refer to the affective and cognitive 
subappraisals as respectively 'hedonic level of affect' and 'contentment'. These concepts are 
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delineated in more detail in Veenhoven (1984: chapter 2). 
 
3.2       Measures of happiness  
All these variants of happiness can be measured by the self report. Different questions have been 
developed for that purpose. For a review of the items and scales, see Veenhoven (1984: chapter 
4). The most commonly used item is a single question: "Taking all together, how happy would 
you say you are? Very happy, fairly happy, not too happy or not at all happy?" Another common 
question is how 'satisfied' are you with your life as a whole. Hedonic level is often measured by 
the ten-item ‘Affect Balance Scale’ (ABS, Bradburn 1969), which concerns the occurrence of 
specific positive and negative affects in the past few weeks. This ABS method seems best suited 
for a cross-national comparison. 
 Since the 1970's happiness has served as a core variable in 'Quality of Life' surveys in 
many developed nations. This has resulted in a growing body of data on average happiness in 
nations. These data have been collated in the World Database of Happiness (Veenhoven 1999). 
 Though currently used, these measures are much criticized. Three main objections have 
raised. First it is doubted that responses to such simple questions reflect true appreciation of life. 
Second, there are doubts about the comparability of such ratings across cultures. Third, it is 
claimed that subjective appraisals of life are meaningless. I will now present a short review of 
this criticism. For more elaborate discussions of the measurement problems involved see: Diener 
(1995), Headey & Wearing (1992), Saris et al. (1996), and Veenhoven (1993, 1996a). 
 
3.2.1   Validity of self reports on happiness  
The first objection is that responses to questions about happiness do not adequately reflect how 
people really feel about their life. Several reasons have been suggested. 
 One of the misgivings is that most people have no opinion about their happiness. They 
would be more aware of how happy they are expected to be, and report on that instead. Though 
this may happen incidentally, it appears not to be the rule. Most people know quite well whether 
or not they enjoy life. Eight out of ten Americans think of it every week. Responses on questions 
about happiness tend to be prompt. The non-response rate on these items is low; both absolutely 
(± 1%) and relative to other attitudinal questions. They `don't know' responses are also infre-
quent. 
 A related claim is that respondents confuse their actual satisfaction with how satisfied 
other people view them, given their life situation. If this were so, people considered to be well 
off would typically report being happy, and people regarded as disadvantaged would avow 
themselves unhappy. This pattern does occur, but it is not widespread. For instance, in the 
Netherlands good education is seen to be a prerequisite for a good life, but among the best- 
educated  respondents of happiness appear to be slightly lower. 
 Another objection concerns the presence of systematic bias in responses. It is assumed 
that questions on happiness are interpreted correctly, but that the responses are often inaccurate. 
People who are actually dissatisfied with their lives say that they are contented. Ego protection 
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and social appearances are said to be the causes of these distortions. This bias is said to manifest 
an overreporting of happiness; with most people claiming to be happy, and most perceiving 
themselves as happier than average. Other evidence of bias is suggested by the finding that 
psychosomatic complaints are not uncommon among the happy. These observations could be 
correct, but the findings also allow other interpretations. First, is the fact that the majority reports 
themselves to be happy. This may not imply overreport but rather that most people are indeed 
satisfied with life. When living conditions are not extremely bad this could be a candid response. 
Second, there are at least three good reasons why many people could  think that they are more 
satisfied than average. One is that we underestimate the happiness of our fellow citizen, since 
misery is more conspicuous than prosperity. Third, the presence of headaches and worries 
among the satisfied does not prove response distortion. Life can be a bitter trial at times but still 
be satisfying on balance. The proof is in demonstrating the response distortion. Some clinical 
studies have tried to do this by comparing responses to single direct questions with ratings based 
on in-depth interviews and projective tests. The results are generally not much different from 
responses to a single direct question posed by an anonymous interviewer. 
 The suspected flaws in self-reported happiness are discussed in more detail in 
Veenhoven (1984, chapter 3) and Headey & Wearing (1992, chapter 3). None of the doubts 
have has been corroborated as yet. 
 
3.2.2    Comparability of across countries   
The evidence above concerns the measurement of happiness within countries. It does remove 
the questions  about the comparability of responses across countries. These need to be addressed 
in separate tests. 
 A commonly voiced concern is that differences in language may hinder comparison. 
Words like `happiness' and `satisfaction' do not have quite the same meaning in different 
languages. Questions applying such terms will therefore measure slightly different matters. This 
hypothesis was checked by comparing the rank order of nations produced by three kinds of 
questions on the  appreciation of life-as-whole: a question about `happiness', a question about 
`satisfaction' with life and a question that invites the respondent to give  a rating between `best' 
and `worst possible life'. The rank orders turned out to be almost identical. As another check, re-
sponses to questions on happiness and satisfaction in two bi-lingual countries were compared, 
and  they did not show a linguistic bias. 
 A second objection is that responses to questions on happiness are distorted by social 
desirability, and that these biases differ across cultures. One of the manifestations is more 
avowal of happiness in countries where happiness ranks high in the value hierarchy. This claim 
was inspected by checking whether reported happiness is indeed higher in countries where 
hedonic values are most endorsed. This appeared not to be the case. A second check was an 
inspection of whether reports of general happiness deviated from responses made a few weeks 
earlier in these countries; the former measures were more vulnerable to desirability distortion 
than the latter, so this notion was also disproved . 
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 A third claim is that convention in communication distort the answers dissimilarly in 
different countries. For instance, a collectivistic orientation might discourage `very' satisfied 
responses, since modest self presentation is more appropriate in this cultural context. This 
hypothesis was tested by comparing happiness in countries differing in value collectivism, but 
no effect was found for the predicted direction. The hypothesis also failed several other tests. 
 A related claim holds that happiness is a typically Western concept. Unfamiliarity with it 
in non-Western nations is said to involve several effects: responses could be  haphazard, and 
uncertainty could create a tendency to choose middle categories on the response scales, which 
results in relatively low average scores. If so, more don't know and no answer responses can be 
expected in non-Western nations; however, that appeared not to be the case. The frequency of  
responses was about 1% in all regions of the world. 
 All these claims imply that there is little relationship between average happiness reports 
and experienced quality of life in nations. Yet correlational studies show huge correlations with 
nation features such as economic prosperity, peacefulness, and schooling. Together such nation 
properties explain about 70% of the differences in reported happiness. 
 These empirical checks have been reported in more detail in Veenhoven (1993, 1996a). 
There may be other distortions that only time will reveal us. For the present, it appears that self 
reports of overall happiness can be meaningfully compared across nations.  
 
3.2.3    Significance of average happiness   
The last objection is that subjective happiness does not reflect real quality of life. This objection 
has two variants: one variant holds that happiness is 'relative' and the other that it is mere 
'folklore'. 
 
Relative? The first variant holds that happiness judgements draw on comparisons within the 
nation, so happiness cannot be meaningfully compared across nations. This view is based on the 
notion that happiness comes from comparative social standing. Some often cited investigations 
claim support for this theory. Easterlin (1974) saw the theory validated by his observation that 
happiness is as high in poor countries as it is in rich countries. Brickman et al (1978) saw proof 
in the fact that lottery winners are no more satisfied with life than paralyzed accident victims. I 
have analyzed these sensational claims elsewhere (Veenhoven 1991, 1995), and the results can 
be summarized as follows: 
 In general happiness is not the same in poor and rich nations neither are accident victims 
equally as happy as lottery winners. The differences may be smaller than one might have 
thought, but they undeniably exist. 
 Some other implications of regarding happiness as relative also failed an empirical test. 
One that changes in living conditions, for better or worse, do not have a lasting effect on 
happiness. To the contrary, there is good evidence that people do not adjust to everything. For 
instance, one does not adjust completely to the misfortune of having a handicapped child or the 
loss of a partner. 
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 Another implication is that earlier hardship means later happiness. This hypothesis does 
not fit the data either. For example, survivors of the Holocaust living in Israel were found to be 
less satisfied with life than Israelis of the same age who had not been persecuted. 
 A final empirical check to be considered is the correlation of happiness with income. 
The idea that happiness is relative predicts a strong correlation in all countries, irrespective of 
their wealth. Income is an important criterion for social comparisons, and it is typically 
compared within countries. Again, the hypothesis is not confirmed by the data. The correlation 
of happiness with income is high in poor countries, but low in rich countries (Veenhoven & 
Timmermans 1998). 
 The idea that happiness is 'relative' assumes that happiness is a purely cognitive matter 
and does not acknowledge affective experience. It focuses on 'wants' and neglects 'needs'. In 
contrast to wants, needs are not relative. An alternative 'affective' theory is that we infer 
happiness from how we feel generally. If we feel fine, we gather that we must be happy. If we 
feel lousy most of the time, we conclude we must be unhappy. Unlike conscious comparisons 
between ideal and real, affects are largely unreasoned experiences that likely signal the degree to 
which basic needs are met. The evidence for this theory is mounting. It denotes that happiness 
ratings reflect something universal that can be meaningfully compared cross-culturally.  
 
Folklore? A second variant of the insignificance objection is that reports of happiness have a 
superficial aspect and do not reflect the actual quality of life in a country. In this view, happiness 
ratings may be treated as local myths. Comparing happiness reports is like equating apples, 
pears, and bananas. 
 The theory of happiness behind this argument is also cognitive. Happiness is seen as a 
stereotypical state. Support for this view comes from some unexpected differences noted in the 
average happiness between nations, such as low happiness in France and the high happiness in 
the U.S. The idea was also nourished by the finding that average happiness remained at the same 
level in postwar U.S., despite the doubling of the cross national product. 
 I have put this theory to several tests (Veenhoven 1992b: 66-79, 1994, 1995). One 
implication is that differences in average happiness are unrelated to variation in the objective 
quality of life. Four such differences were considered: economic affluence, social equality, 
political freedom, and intellectual development. These national characteristics explained 70% of 
the differences in average happiness in a 28 nation set. Further, there were instances of a change 
in average happiness following the improvement or a decline of quality of  life. 
   The residual variances should have been evident in regression charts. If the French 
national character is to understate happiness and the American to overstate it, we can expect to 
find the French less happy than predicted on the basis of objective welfare and Americans more 
happy than their situation justifies. No such patterns appeared.  
 Yet another test of happiness involved migrants. If happiness reflects the quality of the 
conditions one lives in, the happiness of migrants in a country must be close to that of autoch-
thons. If happiness were a matter of socialized outlook, the happiness of migrants should be 
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closer to the level in their motherland. The former prediction turned out to be true, the latter not. 
 
 
3.3       Happiness rank of nations 
Comparable data on average happiness for 48 nations in the early 1990's is now available. The 
scores are listed in appendix 2 and presented in the bar diagram of  scheme 8. 
 Sizable differences are evident. In Bulgaria the average score on this 1-4 scale is only 
2.4, whereas in the Netherlands it is 3.4. This is 30% of the possible range. In this time period, 
happiness is lowest in the former by communist countries and highest in the rich countries of 
North-west Europe.  
 The scores in scheme 8 are average responses to the single question: "Taking all together 
how happy would you say you are?". Responses to a 10 step item on life satisfaction scale and 
on the 10 item Affect Balance Scale show about the same rank order of nations. Earlier studies 
on a slightly different nation set yielded similar rankings (e.g. Cantril 1965, Inglehart 1990) 
 
 
 
4.      FREEDOM and HAPPINESS 
We compiled our data on both freedom and happiness for 44 countries in the early 1990's. The 
data are presented in appendix 2. We can now answer the questions at stake.  
 
4.1      Does freedom raise happiness? 
The first question was whether freedom tends to work out positively. Correlational analysis 
suggests it does indeed. See scheme 6.  
 In the middle column of scheme 6 shows the basic correlations between the measures of 
freedom and happiness. All the correlations are positive and statistically significant. The last 
relationship is fully illustrated in scheme 3. The scatter plot shows a cluster of free and happy 
nations in the upper tight-hand corner. Represented in this cluster are Netherlands (nl), 
Switzerland (ch), Iceland (is), Britain (gb), and the U.S. Below this appears a cluster of former 
by communist countries that were not yet entirely free after the fall of the Eastern bloc and quite 
unhappy, but these least happy countries are not the least free. Freedom scores are lower in 
Nigeria (ng), China (cn) and India (in). The greater dispersion in the lower left-hand corner of 
the scatter plot may be due to a temporal happiness dip in the post communist countries caused 
by the turmoil of the transformation. In time this may change, but there is still a evident clear 
pattern to the data.  
 The distribution of data suggests a linear  relationship. Except for Canada (cn) there is 
no evidence of diminishing returns. This is noteworthy because the relationship between 
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happiness and the wealth of a nation does reveal a convex pattern (Veenhoven 1989, Veenhoven 
& Timmermans 1998). The implication is that freedom has not yet reached the level where its 
costs balance the benefits. 
 If we leave out the Eastern European countries in scheme 3, we even see a tendency in the 
curve to rise, which suggests that the happiness yields of freedom increases at higher levels. 
 
 
 
 
A look at scheme 3 makes clear that the most free and happy nations are typically rich countries, 
while the unfree and unhappy nations tend to be poor. So the observed correlations may be 
spurious. To check this possibility, the wealth of nations was controlled for statistically. See the 
partial correlations in column 3 of scheme 6. Now all correlations are reduced to insignificance, 
except the correlation with economic freedom. 
 This control may be too strict. It removes all common variance with wealth, not only the 
variance caused by effects of wealth on freedom and happiness, but also possible effects of free-
dom on happiness through wealth, and vise versa. On the basis of this cross-sectional data we 
cannot disentangle these effects. So it is still likely that the true correlation is sizable. 
  
 
 
4.2       Which kind of freedom? 
The second question can be answered more easily. Scheme 6 shows that opportunity to choose is 
about as equally related to happiness as the capability to choose. The difference in correlation is 
not significant, neither is the difference in raw correlations nor the difference in partial 
correlation. 
 Looking at opportunities more closely, it is clear that economic freedom is most strongly 
related to happiness; the zero-order correlation is +.69 and the partial correlation is +.43. 
Political freedom and private freedom are less related to happiness; the zero-order correlations 
are  +.39, and the partial correlations are also positive but insignificant. This is a pleasant 
surprise for the right-wing free market lobby, but a disappointment for liberals like me. More 
surprising is that the correlation with economic freedom appears to be largely independent of 
wealth. The partial correlation is +.43! This means that economic freedom must affect happiness 
in other ways than through  economic growth. 
 Looking now more closely at the capability to choose, we see that information is less 
correlated to happiness than inclination to choose. The difference is particularly clear in the 
partial correlations.  
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4.3       In which conditions? 
Although it is generally acknowledged that the relationships between freedom and happiness is 
conditional, there is no clear opinion on the kind of contingencies involved. Two possibilities 
are explored below. 
 
4.3.1    Only when opportunities match capabilities? 
It seems logical that the opportunity to choose adds to happiness only when accompanied by a 
capability to choose. Chances one cannot pick are of no help. To test this hypothesis, we 
separated the countries that score low on capability from those that score high. The data are 
presented in scheme 7.  
 The hypothesis is confirmed for political freedom and private freedom. The opportunity 
to choose is negatively related to happiness among nations of low capability and positively in 
nations of high capability. The difference in correlations is considerable. 
 Yet the hypothesis is not confirmed for economic freedom. In fact economic freedom is 
more strongly related to happiness in low-capability nations than in high-capability nations (r = 
+.77 respectively  +.34) 
 This is an interesting outcome. Several explanations come to my mind: one is that 
making economic choices requires different capabilities than making choices of a political or 
private nature, possibly this is because the market choice is more structured. Another 
explanation may be that economic freedom affects happiness rather indirectly, such as by 
relieving dependency in oppressive family situations or by reducing social tensions. Such effects 
do not involve individual capabilities.  
 
 
Similarly one could argue that capability to choose will add to happiness only if there is an 
opportunity to choose. Capability may even give rise to frustration if it cannot be applied. The 
data are presented in scheme 9. 
 As scheme 9 indicates, the hypothesis is confirmed. Among nations where the opportunity 
to choose is low, happiness is unrelated to the summed capability to choose. Yet among nations 
that offer much opportunity to choose, the correlations are consistently positive and sizable. This 
pattern is largely due to the information factor. The correlations with inclination (individualist 
values and perceived control) differentiate less well. 
 
 
4.3.2    Only in affluence? 
Another consideration is that freedom adds to happiness only among affluent nations. One 
reason may be that poor countries simply cannot afford the luxury of freedom, since all effort is 
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dedicated to making ends meet. Another logic might be that freedom does not pay in poverty 
because there is little with which  to choose. The data on this matter are presented in scheme 10. 
 In line with expectation we see that comprehensive freedom is unrelated to happiness in 
poor nations (r = +.07ns), but positive in rich nations (r = +.49*). Looking at the summed 
opportunities and the summed capabilities separately, we see the same pattern. Yet again, 
economic freedom behaves differently. In this case we see a strong positive correlation among 
poor nations and a smaller, non-significant correlation among rich nations.  
  
 
5.         DISCUSSION 
 
In view of these findings, we must begin acknowledge some limitations.  
 Firstly, we must remember that this study deals with limited conceptions of both 
freedom and happiness. Freedom is considered in the emancipatory sense of  limitation to 
interference by others, in particular restrictions by governments. Happiness is considered as the 
subjective enjoyment of life. So the data presented here do not conclude philosophical debates in 
which these term have been used with broader meanings. 
 Secondly, we must realize that the measures of these concepts are not perfect, especially 
with regard to the measurement of freedom. The 'opportunity' to choose cannot be measured to 
incorporate exhaustively all possible restrictions. The three opportunity domains do not cover all 
relevant areas of life, and the measures of freedom in these domains do not regard all limitations. 
The measures of 'capability to choose' are not ideal either. The level of education in a country is 
at best a dim reflection of its citizens'  'awareness of alternatives'. Likewise, adherence to 
individualist work values does not measure the 'inclination to choose' very well. Though clearly 
incomplete, these measures do not seem systematically flawed in a particular direction. So the 
imperfections will probably attenuate the findings rather than produce deceptive relationships. If 
so, that means that the real relationships are even stronger than the observed correlations 
suggest.  
 Thirdly, this study is greatly limited in that it covers only 46 nations. As a result, many 
of the differences observed do not reach statistical significance. So this study leaves doubt about 
these modest relationships. Still, several relationships were sufficiently strong to produce 
significant effects among the differences that did not reach statistical significance several are at 
least suggestive of the effect.   
 Lastly, we must remember that the post-communist countries distort the picture 
somewhat. The data are from the early 1990's when economic and political freedom had just 
been proclaimed, but perils of transition depressed happiness.  This effect is likely to have 
reduced the correlations as well. 
 
Let us assume that the observed relationships are realistic, what then does that mean? The 
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correlations mentioned were interpreted as effects of freedom on happiness. Inferred that  
freedom make life more enjoyable. Although freedom may have some negative effects, the 
positive effects dominate, in particular, when opportunities match capabilities and in conditions 
of material affluence. A pattern of diminishing utility was not observed in the data. Economic 
freedom was identified as a main condition for happiness in poor nations, and political freedom  
the differentiating factor in rich nations. 
 Although this interpretation is plausible, it is not the only one possible. The statistical 
relationships can also be due to effect of happiness on freedom. A high level of happiness in a 
country can foster a climate of tolerance and reasonableness in which freedom works. In other 
words, happy people can be better citizens. In this reasoning mass happiness is likely to breed 
'opportunities to choose', i.e. foster the development of  nonrestrictive regimes. Similarly one 
could also imagine that happiness nurtures the 'capability to choose', for instance, by its effects 
on energy and self-esteem  (Veenhoven 1988).    
 Yet, we know from history that freedom often emerges from frustration. The French 
Revolution was not a hallmark of happiness. The present-day emergence of freedom in the post-
communist world was not the fruit of mass happiness either. So, the effects of happiness on 
freedom seem at best secondary, in particular, the effects on economic freedom.  
 To settle this question of causality we need to review trenddata over long time periods in 
a sizable group of countries. Such data are not available yet, though the time-series on all 
variables are growing. For the time being, I will assume that  the data reflect effects of freedom 
in the first place. 
 
If freedom does foster happiness, the next question is how. One could envision several 
mechanisms.  Freedom may reduce the chance that people will harass each other: in particular 
this regards political freedom. Further freedom in society may adds to the chance that citizens 
live a way of life that fits well with their preferences and capacities. Conditions of freedom 
encourage the development of a different lifestyles that allows individuals to experiment. In 
particular, private freedom can facilitate the selection of best fitting lifestyles. Next to these 
direct effects, freedom may contributes to happiness in indirect ways, for instance, to the growth 
of material wealth which leads especially to economic freedom. 
 This is not to deny the negative effects of freedom. Freedom can also destroy happiness. 
Obviously, economic freedom often gives rise to income inequality, which according to Marx, 
contributes to the 'Verelendung' of the working poor. Likewise political freedom and private 
freedom can create anomie. Nevertheless, the positive correlations of freedom outweigh the 
negative correlations, though not equally in all circumstances. 
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philosophers could not solve. Both freedom and happiness can be measured across nations. 
Though measures are not ideal yet, and data limited, good evidence is feasible.  
 The first substantive conclusion is that freedom does not always contribute to happiness, 
but it does not destroy it either. Significant negative effects of freedom have not been observed. 
The question is where do the positive effects occur?  
 Secondly is that the data strongly suggest that economic freedom leads to happiness, 
especially for those in conditions of poverty and low capability. Adam Smith rests quit in his 
grave.  
 Third is the less sure that political freedom and private freedom also add to happiness. 
This effect appears to be restricted to rich and capable countries. Though smaller than expected, 
this is still a windfall for humanistic liberalists. 
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The major conclusion is methodological: empirical research can settle this matter which 
6.       CONCLUSIONS 
Scheme 1 
Freedom in nations: opportunity to choose 
46 nations early 1990's 
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Scheme 2 
Freedom in nations: capability to choose 
46 nations early 1990's 
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Scheme 3
Freedom and happiness 
46 nations in the early 1990's 
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Scheme 4
Inter correlations of freedom-variants in 44 nations early 1990's 
Variants of freedom  Opportunity to choose  Capability to choose 
  Economic  political  personal  information  inclination 
Opportunity to choose 
 
*  economic freedom 
*  political freedom 
*  personal freedom 
 
*  summed  opportunities 
 
 
 
 — 
 +.38 *  
 +.23 ns 
 
 +.74 ** 
 
 
 
 — 
 +.69 ** 
 
 +.86 ** 
 
 
 
 
 
 — 
 
 +.82 ** 
  
Capability to choose 
 
* information 
* inclination 
 
* summed capabilities 
 
 
 
 +.24 ns 
 +.45 ** 
 
 +.49** 
 
 
 +.77 ** 
 +.45 ** 
 
 +.76 ** 
 
 
 +.70 ** 
 +.34 *  
 
 +.59 ** 
 
 
 - 
 +.38 ** 
 
 +.82 ** 
 
 
 
 
 
 +.83 ** 
Comprehensive freedom: 
Opportunities + capabilities 
 
 
 +.55 ** 
 
 +.84 ** 
 
 +.73 ** 
 
 +.81 ** 
 
 +.76 ** 
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Scheme 5
Freedom and related matters 
  Human rights 
 Humana-index  
 Perceived 
 freedom 
 (WVS) 
 Women  
 emancipation 
 UNHDR (1995) 
 individualism 
 expert rating 
Opportunity to choose 
 
* economic freedom 
* political freedom 
* personal freedom 
 
* summed opportunities 
 
 
 
 +.06 ns 
 +.90 ** 1  +.39 * 
 +.80 ** 2  +.30 ns 
 
 +.82 ** 2  +.54 ** 
 
 
 +.47 ** 
 
 
 
 +.37 *  
 +.65 ** 
 +.75 ** 
 
 +.70 ** 
 
 
 +.55 ** 
 +.75 ** 
 +.73 ** 
 
 +.79 ** 
Capability to choose 
 
* information 
* inclination 
 
* summed capabilities 
 
 
 
 +.75 ** 
 +.41 ** 
 
 +.69 ** 
 
 
 +.32 ns 
 +.56 ** 
 
 +.57 ** 
 
 
 +.74 ** 
 +.55 ** 
 
 +.73 ** 
 
 
 +.67 ** 
 +.65 ** 
 
 +.78 ** 
  
Summed  
Opportunities + capabilities 
 
 
 +.79 ** 
 
 +.56 ** 
 
 +.73 ** 
 
 +.82 ** 
 
Notes: 1 Humana's index of Human rights overlaps largely with the index of political freedom 
 2 Some items of the Humana-index figure in the personal freedom factor. 
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Scheme 6 
Happiness and freedom in 46 nations early 1990's 
  
 
Variants of freedom 
 
 Correlation with happiness 
 
  zero-order correlation 
 
   
 partial correlation 
 wealth of nation controlled 
  
 
 
Opportunity to choose 
 
*  economic freedom 
*  political freedom 
*  personal freedom 
 
* summed opportunities 
 
 
 
 
 +.69 ** 
 +.39 ** 
 +.39 ** 
 
 +.67 ** 
 
 
 
 +.43 ** 
 +.16 ns 
 +.11 ns 
 
 +.29 ns 
 
Capability to choose 
 
* information 
* inclination 
 
* summed capabilities 
 
 
 
 
 +.32 *  
 +.59 ** 
 
 +.59 ** 
 
 
 
 —.19 ns 
 +.30 ns 
 
 +.13 ns 
 
Comprehensive freedom: 
opportunities + capabilities 
 
 
 
 +.64 ** 
 
 
 +.26 ns 
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Scheme 7
Opportunity to choose and happiness split-up by capability to choose 
 
 
Opportunity to choose 
 
 Correlation with happiness 
 
  low capability 
 
  N = 20 
 high capability 
 
 N = 25 
 
 
 
 
 
Economic freedom 
 
Political freedom 
 
Personal freedom 
 
 
Summed opportunities 
 
 zero-order 
 correlation 
 
 
 +.77 ** 
 
 —.30 ns 
 
 —.21 ns 
 
 
 +.07 ns 
 Wealth 
 Controlled 
 
 
 +.80 ** 
 
 —.21 ns 
 
 —.10 ns 
 
 
 +.25 ns 
 zero-order 
 correlation 
 
 
 +.34 ns 
 
 +.76 ** 
 
 +.58 ** 
 
 
 +.63 ** 
 wealth 
 controlled 
 
 
 +.03 ns 
 
 +.64 ** 
 
 +.37 ns 
 
 
 +.44 ns 
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Scheme 8 
Happiness in nations 
48 nations early 1990's 
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Scheme 9
Capability to choose and happiness split-up by summed opportunity to choose 
 
 
 Capability to choose 
 
 Correlation with happiness 
 
  low opportunity 
 
  N = 21 
 high opportunity 
 
 N = 26 
 
 
 
 
 
Information 
 
Inclination 
 
 
Summed capabilities 
 
 zero-order 
 correlation 
 
 
 —.33 ns 
 
 +.27 ns 
 
 
 —.04 ns 
 Wealth 
 Controlled 
 
 
 —.36 ns 
 
 +.30 ns 
 
 
 —.05 ns 
 zero-order 
 correlation 
 
 
 +.47 *  
 
 +.50 *  
 
 
 +.51 *  
 Wealth 
 Controlled 
 
 
 +.29 ns 
 
 +.34 ns 
 
 
 +.33 ns 
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Scheme 10
Freedom and happiness split-up by wealth of nation 
 
 
Variants of freedom 
 
 Correlation with happiness 
  
  Poor nations 
 
  N = 22 
 rich nations 
 
 N = 25 
 
 
Opportunity to choose 
 
*  economic freedom 
*  political freedom 
*  personal freedom 
 
* summed opportunities 
 
 
 
 
 +.74 ** 
 +.29 ns 
 —.25 ns 
 
 +.12 ns 
 
 
 
 +.24 ns 
 +.54 ** 
 +.38 ns 
 
 +.45 *  
 
Capability to choose 
 
* information 
* inclination 
 
* summed capabilities 
 
 
 
 
 —.26 ns 
 +.38 ns 
 
 +.01 ns 
 
 
 
 +.39 ns 
 +.28 ns 
 
 +.34 ns 
 
Comprehensive freedom 
opportunities + capabilities 
 
 
 
 +.07 ns 
 
 
 +.49 *  
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Appendix 2 
Happiness and freedom 
44 nations early 1990's 
 
Nation 
 
code name 
 Happiness 
 Scale 1-4 
 Freedom  
 z-scores 
    opportunity  capability  sum 
AR Argentina*  3,07  —0,71    —0,63 
AU Australia 3,30  —0,68  +0,80 +1,79 
AT Austria  3,20  —0,65  +0,86  +0,23 
BE Belgium  3,31  +0,93  +0,44  +0,98 
BR Brazil  2,94  —1,26  —0,75  —0,63 
GB Britain  3,28  +0,87  +0,85  +1,76 
BG Bulgaria  2,33  —0,90    —1,29 
CA Canada  3,05  +1,22  +1,58  +0,83 
CL Chile*  3,03  —0,42    —1,26 
CN China*  2,92    —1,89  —1,09 
CZ Czecho—Slovakia (former)  2,69  +0,34    —0,78 
DK Denmark  3,36  +0,82  +0,82  +1,78 
EE Estonia  2,58      —0,77 
FI Finland  3,09  +1,14  +0,78  +0,94 
FR France  3,16  +0,84  +0,47  +1,73 
DB Germany (former West—)       3,04   +0,80  +0,78  +1,34 
DD Germany (former East-)  2,96    +0,38  —0,69 
GR Greece  2,77  —0,40  —0,13  —0,93 
HU Hungary  2,72  —0,14  +0,26  —0,27 
IS Iceland  3,38  +0,54  +0,32   
IN India*  2,81  —1,86  —2,40  —0,53 
IE Ireland  3,36  —0,12  —0,08  +0,89 
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Nation 
 
code name 
 Happiness 
 Scale 1-4 
 Freedom  
 z-scores 
    opportunity  capability  sum 
IL Israel  2,88  —0,94  —0,34  —0,36 
IT Italy  2,98  +0,63  +0,40   +1,08  
JP Japan  3,00  +0,47  —0,28  —0,42 
LU Luxembourg  3,18    +0,44   
MX Mexico  2,95  —0,55  —0,78  —0,85 
NZ New Zealand  3,18  —0,64  +0,72  +0,83 
NL Netherlands  3,39  +1,72  +0,83  +1,46 
NG Nigeria  2,93  —2,79  —2,50  —1,45 
NO Norway  3,23  +0,50  0,47  +1,10 
PH Philippines  3,08  —0,50  —1,04  —0,83 
PL Poland  2,97  —0,91  —0,18  —0,32 
PT Portugal  2,83  —0,02  —0,76  —2,89 
RO Romania  2,63  —1,35    —0,62 
RU Russia  2,53    +0,15  —1,10 
ZA South Africa  2,82  —0,74  —1,40  +0,28 
KR South Korea  2,86  —0,27  —0,76  —2,26 
SI Slovenia  2,62      +0,66 
ES Spain  3,04  +0,21  +0,89  +0,28 
SE Sweden  3,36  +0,69  +0,82  +1,04 
CH Switzerland  3,30  +1,19  +0,85  +1,33 
TR Turkey*  3,08  —1,74  —1,20  —0,99 
US United States of America  3,28  +0,99  +1,76  +1,97 
 
Happiness from World Database of Happiness (update 1996), tables 1.1.1a and 1.1.1b. Most of the data from World 
Value Study 2.  
* Happiness score probably too high. Score based on samples in which poor rural population was underrepresented 
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Appendix 1 
Correlations happiness and freedom 44 nations early 1990  
 
Indicators of freedom in nation   Data source     correlation with average happiness  N 
                  zero-order  wealth controlled  
 
OPPORTUNITY TO CHOOSE 
Economic freedom     Gwartney 1996 table A1-1          
Security of money 
* little money expansion          +.22 ns  -.22 ns   38 
* little inflation variability         +.37 *   -.10 ns  38 
* domestic foreign currency accounts allowed       +.59 **  +.28 ns  38 
* deposits abroad allowed         +.59 **  +.33 *   38 
Freedom to produce and consume (little government interference) 
* little government consumption         -.18 ns   +.31 ns  38 
* little share government enterprises        +.62 **  +.38 *   38 
* little price controls          +.61 **  +.33 *   38 
* little interference on credit market        +.36 *   -.10 ns  38 
Freedom to keep what one earns 
* low transfers and subsidies         -.06 ns   +.38 *   38 
* low marginal tax rates          -.06 ns   -.09 ns   38 
* no conscription           +.28 ns  +.26 ns                       38 
Freedom of exchange 
* low trade taxes           +.17 ns  -.40 *   38 
* little exchange rate controls         +.71 **  +.47 *   38 
* trade sector relatively big         +.21 ns  +.22 ns  38 
* little restraint on capital mobility        +.63 **  +.24 ns  38 
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Indicators of freedom in nation   Data source     correlation with average happiness  N 
                  zero-order  wealth controlled  
 
Index of the above based on expert weights        +.73 **  +.43 *   38 
 
 
Political freedom     Karantnycky 1996 
Respect of political rights          +.35 *   —.11 ns  47 
Respect of civil rights           +.41 *   —.03 ns  47 
 
 
Personal freedom 
Freedom of religion: 
* legal/practical opportunity   Humana 1992, item 38    .22 ns   .14 ns   
Freedom to travel 
* legal/practical opportunity 
 * travel in country   Humana 1992, item 1    +.17 ns  +.01 ns  46 
 * travel abroad    Humana 1992, item 2    +.05 ns  —.35 *   46 
Freedom of marriage 
* legal/practical opportunity 
 * marriage    Humana 1992, item 36-37   +.19 ns  —.17 ns  46 
* public acceptance of 
 *  divorce    World Value Survey 2, item 310  +.18 ns  +.01 ns  42 
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Indicators of freedom in nation   Data source     correlation with average happiness  N 
                  zero-order  wealth controlled  
 
Freedom of procreation:  
* legal/practical restrictions to:  
 * abortion     PAI 1995     +.13 ns  —.21 ns  38 
 * sterilization    IPPF 1990     +.18 ns  +.02 ns  35 
* public acceptance of         
 * abortion    World Value Survey 2, item 309  —.02 ns  —.19 ns  21 
 * planned single motherhood  World Value Survey 2, item 217  +.01 ns  +.11 ns  41 
Freedom of sexuality:  
* public acceptance of: 
 * homosexuality    World Value Study 2, item 307   +.72 **  +.38 *   42 
 * prostitution    World Value Study 2, item 308   +.35 ns  +.07 ns  42 
Freedom to die:  
* public acceptance of:  
 * suicide     World Value Study 2, item 313   +.29 ns  +.09 ns  42 
 * euthanasia    World Value Study 2, item 312   +.28 ns  +.05 ns  42 
 
Average private freedom (mean z-scores)   religion + travel + sex +   +.38 *   —.13 ns  43 
       marriage + death 
        
Average opportunity to choose (mean z-scores)  economic + political + private   +.60 **  +.04 ns  43 
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Indicators of freedom in nation   Data source     correlation with average happiness   N 
                  zero-order  wealth controlled  
 
CAPABILITY TO CHOOSE 
 
 
Awareness of alternatives 
Education 
* literacy + school-enrolment   Human Development Report 1995  +.32 *   —.19 ns  47 
 
Inclination to choose 
Individualistic work-values    Hofstede 1991 + Smith 1997   +.52 **  +.30 ns  39 
Perceived fate-control     World Value Survey 2, item 95   +.50 **  +.31 ns  42 
 
 
Average capability to choose    Information + inclination   +.59 **  +.13 ns  46 
 
 
 
COMPREHENSIVE FREEDOM   Opportunities + capabilities   +.64 **  +.26 ns  46 
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NOTES 
 
1. Earlier versions of this paper were presented at 1) 'International Conference of Psychology' 
in Montreal Canada, August 1, 2) the 'International Conference Social Change in an Enlarged 
Europe', Collegium Budapest, Hungary, May 1998, and 3) 'International Conference of Political 
Psychology', Amsterdam, Holland, 1999. 
 
2. The Affect Balance Scale (ABS) has at least three advantages in a cross-national context. 1) 
The ABS is less vulnerable to language-differences than the single happiness- and satisfaction-items. 
Since the ABS involves 10 items, any distortions in translation and understanding are likely to 
neutralize each other. 2) The ABS is less vulnerable to desirability distortion, and therefore also less 
vulnerable for differential distortion of this kind. The ABS concerns about recent affective 
experience, which is a more tangible matter than general happiness and satisfaction. Also admitting 
oneself to have felt bad within the last few weeks is less threatening than avowing to be unhappy. 3) 
The ABS does not require acquaintance with concepts such as 'happiness' and 'satisfaction'. Though 
single items on happiness do not appear to be vulnerable for these distortions either (Veenhoven 
1993, chapter 5), the ABS is still safer method. 
 
3. Inter-correlations are as follows: happiness by life-satisfaction r = +.89, happiness by 
fect balance r = +.57 and life-satisfaction by affect balance r = +.55. af  
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